Florida State University Law Review
Volume 7

Issue 3

Article 5

Summer 1979

42 U.S.C. § 1983: Claims Against States for Damages
Charles E. LeGette, Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Charles E. LeGette, Jr., 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Claims Against States for Damages, 7 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 525
(1979) .
https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol7/iss3/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Florida State University Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact efarrell@law.fsu.edu.

42 U.S.C. § 1983: CLAIMS AGAINST STATES FOR DAMAGES
CHARLES

I.

E. LEGETTE, JR.

INTRODUCTION

Recent United States Supreme Court decisions have created the
possibility that states, individually and through their officers,' may
be sued for damages and other forms of retroactive monetary relief
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 Historically, states and state officers, acting in their official capacities, have not been proper parties against
whom section 1983 damage claims could have been brought2 This
was so primarily because it was felt the eleventh amendment barred
such relief,' and the 42d Congress did not intend for section 1983 to
apply to states, i.e., states were not "persons" under the Act.5 Both
of these longstanding rules of section 1983 law are now of questionable validity. Their current and future strength will be examined in
the following pages.
This note will discuss the cases giving rise to the possibility of
section 1983 claims for monetary relief against states and will analyze the decisions establishing standards governing judicial findings
of congressional intent to abrogate the eleventh amendment. Additionally, this note will apply these standards to the language and
history of section 1983. Finally, the Court's intentions in this area
will be discussed in light of the patent conflict between the concept
1. Based upon these recent cases the Federal District Court for the Northern District of
Florida recently held in Aldredge v. Turlington, 42 U.S.L.W. 2370 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 1978),
that the Florida Commissioner of Education could be sued for damages in his official capacity
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1972) notwithstanding the eleventh amendment. This opinion was
withdrawn on the court's motion on Jan. 25, 1979, in light of the summary decision by the
Fifth Circuit not to allow section 1983 claims for damages against states. Bogard v. Cook,
586 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1978).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1972) states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
3. State officials sued in their individual capacities are clearly "persons" within the
meaning of section 1983. See, e.g., Westberry v. Fisher, 309 F. Supp. 12, 15 (S.D. Me. 19701.
However, when state officials are sued in their official capacities, the courts frequently find
that suits are in reality suits against the states, barred by the eleventh amendment. See
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XI states: "The judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign State."
5. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Gittlemacker v. County of Philadelphia, 413 F.2d 84,
86 n.2 (3d Cir. 1969).
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of federalism and the interest of plaintiffs in being afforded an effective remedy.
II.

BACKGROUND

Although 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was enacted into law in 1871, it lay
dormant until the great resurgence of civil rights in the early 1960's
under the Warren Court. In Monroe v. Pape the Court breathed new
vitality into the statute by construing it to authorize suit in federal
court against thirteen Chicago policemen who entered, searched,
and ransacked the Monroe home without cause.' Before Monroe,
recovery was largely dependent upon remedies provided by state
law. However, while the Court allowed suit against the individual
policemen, it interpreted the statute to exclude cities from its
sweep.7 Hence, the plaintiff was forced to look only to the individual
defendants and their limited resources for relief.
Since judgments are difficult to obtain8 and are frequently impossible to satisfy against individual officials, advocates have made
numerous efforts to sidestep the adverse aspects of Monroe and
reach the financial reserves of governmental entities. Some litigants
attempted to limit Monroe to cities so that section 1983 damage
claims could be brought against other governmental entities such as
school boards. Others attempted to distinguish the case because it
referred only to damage claims and not pleas for restitutionary relief.10 Some imaginative advocates argued that where immunity had
been waived for state law purposes, it should be considered waived
for section 1983 purposes as well." Finally, some claimants, finding
section 1983 too restrictive, attempted to imply causes of action for
civil rights violations against state and local governments directly
from the fourteenth amendment. 2
When claims were brought against states and their officers rather
than local governmental units, the eleventh amendment became an
additional complicating factor. The amendment bars suits by citi6. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
7. Id.at 187.
8. Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 421-22 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (difficult to get awards against officials who are "just trying to do their jobs").
9. Keckeisen v. Independent School Dist., 509 F.2d 1062 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
833 (1975).
10. Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School Dist., 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971).
11. Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
12. Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd en banc 591 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1979)
(no need to imply remedy in light of Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978)).
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zens against nonconsenting states in federal court.' 3 Thus, there is
a direct conflict between the states' interest in immunity from suit
and the needs of injured claimants attempting to collect for violations of their constitutionally protected rights.
The basic pattern for resolving this conflict was established in Ex
parte Young, where railroad stockholders sued Minnesota state officials in federal court seeking equitable relief from an allegedly confiscatory tax statute.'4 The attorney general of Minnesota raised the
eleventh amendment as a defense to the federal court suit.'5 The
Court reconciled the conflicting interests by granting equitable relief against the attorney general who would enforce the taxing statute. The Court said the injunctive relief granted against the state
official, in his official capacity, was not the equivalent of a suit
against the state which the eleventh amendment would bar.'" Following Young, section 1983 claimants attempted to avoid conflicts
with the eleventh amendment and reach the states' financial resources by bringing claims against state officers in their official
capacities.
The Court has been unwilling, however, to push the Young fiction
to its logical extreme. In Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury
the Court held that the eleventh amendment bars damage claims
against state officers because monetary judgments would be satisfied out of the state treasury." Several years later, the Court in
Edelman v. Jordanfurther refined the rules of relief when the fourteenth amendment, through section 1983, clashed with the protection afforded states by the eleventh amendment.' 8 In Edelman, Illinois state officials failed to issue welfare payments in compliance
with federal regulations. In addition to the injunctive relief clearly
authorized by Young, the plaintiffs requested an award of the
wrongfully withheld welfare benefits as "equitable restitution."'"
The Court focused on the fact that the restitutionary relief, though
directed in form at the state officer, was retroactive in nature and
would be satisfied by the state's general revenues. Hence, the Court
concluded that the restitutionary relief was indistinguishable from
an award of damages against the state and was barred by the elev13.
it does
to ban
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Even though the express language of the eleventh amendment clearly indicates that
not apply to suits by citizens against their home states, it has historically been read
these suits. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
209 U.S. 123 (1908).
Id. at 134.
Id. at 159-60.
323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945).
415 U.S. 651 (1974).
Id. at 664.
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enth amendment. 0
After the Edelman decision, it appeared that states and state
officials were well protected from damage claims for violations of
civil rights. Apparently section 1983 failed to provide a remedy,
forcing advocates to develop other theories of relief. However, following Edelman, the Court decided Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer" and
Monell v. Department of Social Services,22 two cases that rekindled
interest in section 1983 as a viable means of obtaining damage
awards against states.
For a number of years, the Court has recognized that in certain
circumstances Congress has the constitutional power to withdraw
the states' eleventh amendment immunity from damage suits. This
authority was first recognized under Congress' broad commerce
power. 23 More recently, the Seventh Circuit has recognized this authority under Congress' war powers. 4 Fitzpatrick extended this ab-:
rogation authority to congressional action based upon the fourteenth amendment.25 Hence, Fitzpatrick raises the possibility that

the enacting Congress might have intended section 1983 to apply to
states and thereby implicitly abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity.
In Monell the Court undertook an extensive evaluation of the
legislative history of section 1983 and concluded that the enacting
Congress did intend for the Act to authorize suit against local governmental entities. 26 In so doing Monell expressly overruled the portion of Monroe v. Pape that held cities were not persons under
section 1983.27
III. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT: THE REQUISITE SHOWING

For a number of years courts, advocates and commentators have
struggled over the clarity and extent of congressional intent that
must be present before courts should hold that Congress removed
20. Id. at 668.
21. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
22. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
23. Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
24. Jennings v. Illinois Office of Educ., 589 F.2d 935 (7th Cir.).
25. Fitzpatrick settles any question following Edelman that state consent is necessary.
The fact that state consent is unnecessary is clearly demonstrated by the circuit court's
treatment of the issue in Fitzpatrick. The circuit court found clear congressional intent to
authorize suit against the states; yet, it denied relief because there was no showing of state
consent to suit. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 519 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1975). In contrast, the Supreme
Court opinion, upon finding that Congress authorized suit, concluded that the eleventh
amendment was not a bar, making no mention whatsoever of the absence of consent by the
state. 427 U.S. at 456. Fitzpatrick also settles any question that Congress does not have
constitutional power to unilaterally abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity.
26. 436 U.S. at 700-01.
27. Id.
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the states' immunity."8 The cases do not clearly and consistently
proclaim whether the necessary intent need be found in the express
statutory language or if it may be found in the legislative history.
Although they do not consistently indicate how clear the congressional expression must be in order for the requisite intent to exist,
these determinations are of crucial importance in order to develop
rules by which section 1983 causes of action may be judged.
The Court's first two decisions dealing with congressional efforts
to remove the states' immunity-Parden v. Terminal Railway in
19649 and Employees of the Department of Public Health and
Welfare v. Department of Public Health and Welfare in
1973 3 0-establish significantly different approaches for ascertaining
congressional intent. In Parden the Court focused upon the broad
language of the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)3 ' and the
need to provide plaintiffs with an effective remedy. 3 In contrast, the
Employees Court required clear language of congressional intent to
remove state immunity, with little concern for the adequacy of the
remaining remedy.
In Parden, employees of the state-owned railroad who were injured in the course of their employment sued the State of Alabama
3
through its railroad company for monetary relief under the FELA.. 3
The Act provided that "[e]very common carrier by railroad while
engaging in commerce between any of the several States '1 4 would
be liable for injuries suffered by its employees, but it made no express mention of states or the eleventh amendment. The Court focused on the broad language of the Act and its purpose of providing
5
all railroad workers with a viable, uniform remedy in federal court.:
In concluding that Congress intended for the Act to apply to states,
the Court reasoned that one class of plaintiffs would be without a
remedy if it recognized the state's immunity.3 6 The Court found that
28. Compare Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines:
CongressionalImposition of Suit Upon the States, 126 U. PENN. L. REv. 1203, 1272-77 (1978)
with Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in ControversiesA bout Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REv. 682, 693-95 (1976).
29. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
30. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
31. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1972).
32. Justice Brennan, the author of Parden, is much more willing to find congressional
intent to authorize citizen suits against states because, in his view, the states' immunity rests
upon common law principles of sovereign immunity rather than the eleventh amendment.
See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 457 (Brennan, J., concurring); Employees, 411 U.S. at 309
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
33. 377 U.S. at 184-85.
34. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1972).
35. 377 U.S. at 188-90.
36. Id. at 190.
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Congress' plenary commerce power provided constitutional authority to enact this legislation and that by commencing the operation
of a railroad twenty years after passage of the Act the 3 7State of
Alabama had consented to being governed by the FELA.
In Employees, workers in state mental hospitals sued Missouri
state officials to recover overtime pay to which they were entitled
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).3 1 The statutory language, extending to "[a]ny employer, ' 3 literally covered the state
just as in Parden. Since the definition of "employer" had been
amended in 1966 to remove a clause which had previously excluded
employers of state and local workers in hospitals, schools and public
institutions, the Act clearly applied to states and state employees."
Nevertheless, the Court barred the federal court suit, finding the
statutory language insufficient due to lack of "clear language that
the constitutional immunity was swept away."'" Unfortunately, the
Court did not indicate what type of clear language would satisfy its
standards2
It is likely that the Employees Court's strict clear language rule
reflects the majority's unexpressed fear that Congress did not have
43
the constitutional power to regulate the wages of state employees.
Mr. Justice Douglas, the author of the Employees opinion, had
dissented in Maryland v. Wirtz where the Court denied a constitutional challenge to the FLSA.11 In Wirtz, Justice Douglas argued
that the statute was an unconstitutional intervention into state fiscal affairs." His fears came to fruition in National League of Cities
v. Usery where the Court overruled Wirtz and found the FLSA to
impinge unconstitutionally upon integral state functions reserved to
the states by the tenth amendment." National League moots
Employees on its facts, but the rules of construction established in
Employees have been carried forward in varying degrees to later
cases.
37. Id. at 192.
38. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1972).
39. Id. § 216(b).
40. 411 U.S. at 283. Employees clearly illustrates that two related issues are involved.
First, does the Act literally reach states, i.e., are states "persons" under the Act? Second,
did Congress intend to remove the states' immunity? The "clear language requirement"
speaks to the second issue and will be used in that fashion in this note.
41. 411 U.S. at 285. Only Justice Brennan felt that Parden controlled this case. Id. at 298
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
42. But see Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
43. See Field, supra note 28, at 1257.
44. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
45. Id. at 203 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
46. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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In Fitzpatrick' male state employees challenged a Connecticut
state retirement plan which allegedly discriminated against their
sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.11 Title
VII forbids discrimination in employment based on race, sex, color
or national origin. It was clear that Title VII applied to states and
state employees. The definition of "person" was amended to include
"governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions." 4 The exclusion of "a state or political subdivision" was removed from the definition of "employer."5 Finally, the amendments broadened the civil remedies previously available to persons
aggrieved by public employers. 5'
Fitzpatrick is significant because the Court concluded that Title
VII allowed suits for damages against the states without mentioning
the Employees' requirement of clear language of congressional intent to lift eleventh amendment immunity.-" The Court's silence
can be interpreted in either of two ways. First, the clear language
rule of Employees was prompted by the suspected unconstitutionality of the FLSA1 3 Hence, the rule should not be strictly applied where the legislation is on firm constitutional ground. Second,
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted under section five of the
fourteenth amendment, 5' and section five legislation may require a
lesser showing of congressional intent to overcome the eleventh
amendment barrier.55 This interpretation is supported by the
Court's evident reliance on the fact that the fourteenth amendment,
unlike article I," was addressed directly to the states, and the
47. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
48. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1972).
49. Id. § 2000e(a).
50. Id. § 2000e(b).
51. Id. §§ 2000e-5(a) to -5(g).
52. Nonetheless, Justice Rehnquist, the author of Fitzpatrick, writing in a later case,
indicated that the statutory language reviewed in Fitzpatrick constituted "express statutory
waiver of the State's immunity." Quern v. Jordan, 99 S. Ct. 1139, 1147 n.16 (1979).
53. See Field, supra note 28, at 1251.
54. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5 state in relevant part:
Section 1.... No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.
55. In Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 698 n.31 (1978), also involving legislation based on
section five, the Court allowed a lesser showing of congressional intent to overcome the
eleventh amendment barrier. However, in Quern v. Jordan, 99 S. Ct. 1139 (1979), the Court
placed little significance on this when it was raised by Justice Brennan in dissent.
56. Both the Federal Employers' Liability Act in Parden and the Fair Labor Standards
Act in Employees were enacted under Congress' article I commerce power. See Parden, 377
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Court's assertion that the eleventh amendment is limited by section
five of the fourteenth amendment.57
Two years following Fitzpatrick, in 1978, the Court again found
congressional abrogation of eleventh amendment immunity in a
fourteenth amendment context. In Hutto v. Finney prisoners in
Arkansas state prisons brought a section 1983 action alleging cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth
amendments." The plaintiffs obtained prospective injunctive relief
which was permissible in accordance with established Supreme
Court decisions.5 9 The plaintiffs' lawyers received an award of attorney fees under an amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the Civil Rights
Attorney Fees Award Act of 1976,1° for their efforts on appeal. The
state challenged the attorney fees as an award of damages against
the state barred by the eleventh amendment.
Mr. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in Hutto, recognized
that the Act's broad language speaking to "any action or proceeding
to enforce . . . [42 U.S.C. § 1983]" literally applied to actions

against states.' Moreover, in response to the state's argument that
the Employees' clear language test required explicit statutory language removing the immunity, the Court relied upon the legislative
history. 2 The House and Senate Reports clearly showed that Congress intended for states to pay attorney fees awards. 3 This is significant because the Court had never before relied upon legislative
history to find congressional intent to abrogate the states' immunity.
The Court justified its relaxation of the clear language rule and
reliance on the legislative history by emphasizing that in section
1988 attorney fees were awarded as "costs" which have always been
awarded independently of the eleventh amendment. 4 The Court
U.S. at 190; Employees, 411 U.S. at 289 (Marshall, J., concurring).
57. 427 U.S. at 453-56.
58. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
59. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
60. The Act states: "In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of... [42 U.S.C.
§ 19831 . . . , the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1978).
61. 437 U.S. at 693-94.
62. The Court disregarded the clear language rule which had previously been read to
require express congressional intent to remove the eleventh amendment immunity on the face
of the statute. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974); Employees of the Dep't of
Pub. Health and Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285
(1973); Tribe, supra note 28, at 694-95.
63. 437 U.S. at 694 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976) and S.
REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
5908).
64. 437 U.S. at 695.
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also reasoned that section 1988 attorney fees were not damage
awards but rather recovery of expenses necessarily incurred to effectuate constitutional rights.65 Finally, the award of attorney fees in
Hutto was not considered to be a significant financial burden on the
states as was the award of overtime wages sought in Employees.6
The Court's felt need to justify its reliance upon the legislative
history is without basis. In making its decisions, the Court should
rely upon whatever relevant and credible evidence the parties offer
regardless of its source. To do less is to suggest that judicial blinders
will result in a superior decision. Some of these factors may be
relevant in determining whether Congress intended to abrogate the
states' immunity but their use here is unjustified." The courts
should have the ability to distinguish between legislative histories
that illuminate and those that obfuscate.

IV. 42 U.S.C. § 1983: DID THE 42D CONGRESS
REMEDY To REACH THE STATES?

INTEND FOR THE

The rampant lawlessness and violence perpetrated upon Negro
citizens and their supporters in the South following the Civil War
motivated Congress to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1871.68 The Act
was designed to accomplish two purposes. First, it created a civil
remedy for persons deprived of their rights under color of state law
and imposed criminal penalties upon members of conspiracies
formed to deprive citizens of their rights. Second, it empowered the
President to intercede into the internal affairs of the states to put
down lawless activities which threatened the people and prevented
the public officers from fulfilling their duties.
The Act as passed contained seven sections, the first of which,
providing for civil remedies, was later codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In this section, Congress chose broad language intended to provide
a remedy reaching far beyond the immediate problems caused by
65. Id. at 695 n.24.
66. Id. at 697 n.27.
67. The extent of the financial burden that the remedy will place on the states may be
relevant in determining whether sufficient evidence exists to infer congressional intent to
remove state immunity. But note that the federal courts have frequently imposed substantial
fiscal strains on states when exercising judicial power. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S.
267, 293 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring) (eleventh amendment defense rejected and federal
injunction upheld even though it ordered the State of Michigan to contribute nearly 6 million
dollars to help desegregate the Detroit school system).
68. Congressional committees recorded volumes of testimony documenting the violence
caused by the Ku Klux Klan. Excerpts of this testimony were read on the floor of Congress
during the debate and can be found at CONG. GLOBE app., 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 117 (1871).
See also 1 B. SCHWAsRTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNrrED STATES: Civn RIGHTs 600 (1970).
69. B. SCHWARTZ supra note 68, at 591.
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the Ku Klux Klan.70 Since the 1960's, it has grown to become one
of the most important remedies available to citizens wronged by the
acts of governments and their agents.7
In Monroe v.Pape72 the Court exempted cities from the Act's
sweep without undertaking a careful and thorough analysis of the
1871 Act to determine if Congress intended the statute to reach
governmental entities.73 The Court relied almost wholly upon the
enacting Congress' rejection of the Sherman Amendment which
would have made cities and towns liable for the damage caused by
all persons within their borders.74 However, the Sherman Amendment was not a proposal to change section 1 which was later codified
as section 1983; rather it was an effort to add an additional section
to the Act.
In Monell v. Department of Social Services, female employees of
the New York City Department of Social Services challenged an
official policy mandating maternity leave without pay prior to medi-5
cal necessity as violative of their rights protected by section 1983.1
The Court undertook an extensive analysis of the 1871 Act and
concluded that its prior holding in Monroe-that cities were not
persons for section 1983 purposes-was incorrect. The Court noted
that Congress rejected the Sherman Amendment believing that it
did not have the power to make local communities responsible for
the acts of all persons in the locale.76 Thus, the Monell Court held
70.

In the words of Mr. Shellabarger, the bill's sponsor in the House of Representatives:
[§ 1983] not only provides a civil remedy for persons whose former condition may
have been that of slaves, but also to all people where, under color of State law, they
or any of them may be deprived of rights to which they are entitled under the
Constitution by reason and virtue of their national citizenship.
CONG. GLOBE app., 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1871). See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242
(1972).
71. See Note, Section 1983 and Federalism: The Burger Court's New Direction, 28 U. FLA.
L. REv. 904, 915 (1976).
72. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
73. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 705, 708 (1978) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
74. For the final text of the Sherman Amendment see CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.
749 (1871).
75. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
76. In arguing against the Sherman Amendment, Representative Willard stated:
[Tihe Constitution has not imposed, . . . any duty upon a county, city, parish,
or any other subdivision of a State, to enforce the laws .... The Constitution has
declared that to be the duty of the State. . . . What can a city do, to give me the
equal protection of the laws? The city and the county have no power except the
power that is given them by the State.
. . .We should not require a county or a city to protect persons in their lives or
property until we confer also upon them the power to furnish that protection.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 791 (1871).
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that due to the Act's broad language there was no reason why local
governments should not be "persons" within the scope of section
1983.17
The plain language of section 1983 satisfactorily complies with
the standards applied by the Court in prior eleventh amendment
cases. First, Monell clearly indicates that the term "person" reaches
beyond natural persons to some types of legal entities.7" Moreover,
the plain language of the statute-"[e]very person who, under
color of any statute" 7"-is literally broad enough to reach the states.
Just as the words "every common carrier" 0 in Parden,"employer"'"
in Employees and the phrase "[i]n any action or proceeding to
enforce a provision of . . . [42 U.S.C. § 1983]"s2 in Hutto were
found to literally reach the states, so too is the language of section
1983 of sufficient breadth to cover states in actions brought under
this section. 3 Second, there is no language suggesting that states
should be excluded.8" In fact, the bill as originally introduced was
entitled a bill "to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States."85 Moreover, the
fourteenth amendment, as the Court emphasized in Fitzpatrick, is
expressly directed at the states and is a limit on the eleventh
amendment."
77. 436 U.S. at 690. The Court also relied upon the definition of "person" in the Dictionary Act. This Act became law only two months prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1871, and it was intended to serve as a guide for interpreting the legislation that would follow.
It provided that "in all acts hereafter passed . . . the word 'person' may extend and be
applied to bodies politic and corporate . . . unless the context shows that such words were
intended to be used in a more limited sense." Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71 § 2, 16 Stat. 431
(current version at 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1972)).
78. 436 U.S. at 690. Following Monell the Court recognized that it was an open question
whether states could be sued for all kinds of relief regardless of the eleventh amendment. See
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 703 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1972).
80. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1972).
81. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1972).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1972).
83. In the words of Senator Thurman, a chief opponent of the Act, "there is no limitation whatsoever upon the terms that are employed, and they are as comprehensive as can be
used." CONG. GLOBE app., 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 217 (1871).
84. The Court in both Parden, 377 U.S. at 189, and more recently in Hutto, 437 U.S. at
694, relied in part upon the absence of exclusionary language to infer congressional intent to
abrogate the states' immunity. Moreover, in Hutto, when Justice Stevens argued that section
1988 authorized fee awards against the states due to the Act's broad language and absence
of exclusionary language, he cited section 1983 to support his argument. Id. at 694. This
suggests that the language of section 1983, like that of section 1988, is sufficient to reach the
states.
85. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st sess. 317 (1871).
86. [W]e think that the Eleventh Amendment . . . [is] necessarily limited by
the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In that section
Congress is expressly granted authority to enforce "by appropriate legislation" the
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In addition to the broad language of the statutes, the Court has
focused upon the effect that denial of the remedy would have upon
plaintiffs. The Court in Hutto focused in part upon the fact that if
the eleventh amendment barred relief, then the Act would be meaningless as applied to states. 7 In Pardenthe Court emphasized that
without the FELA injured plaintiffs would not have a remedy."9
Similarly, if section 1983 does not reach the states, plaintiffs injured
by the wrongful acts of government officials and officers pursuant
to official policy or custom would have to seek monetary or retroactive relief against the individuals involved. Many times these judgments would be uncollectable, and plaintiffs would in effect have
no remedy."9 Furthermore, prospective injunctive relief is of limited
assistance to an individual already injured in a tortious fashion by
government officials under color of state law.9 0
Even though a good basis exists to support extension to states of
section 1983 claims for damages, the Supreme Court has strongly
suggested that it will not approve these claims. In Quern v. Jordan'
the Court, in what Justice Brennan aptly described as "patently
dicta,'

2

reached out and ruled that states are not persons under

section 1983. Thus, the eleventh amendment is a bar to monetary
relief from states in section 1983 actions. 3 This issue was neither
raised, briefed, nor argued by the parties to the suit. 4 In Quern the
5 that section
Court affirmed its earlier holding in Edelman"
1983 did
substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, which themselves embody
significant limitations on state authority. When Congress acts pursuant to § 5...
it is exercising that authority under one section of a constitutional Amendment
whose other sections by their own terms embody limitations on state authority.
427 U.S. at 456 (citation omitted).
87. 437 U.S. at 698 n.31.
88. 377 U.S. at 190.
89. Assuming that the plaintiff obtained a judgment, if the defendant did not have tort
insurance covering personal liability, the judgment may very well go unsatisfied. See FLA.
CONST. art. X, § 4 (exempting the family residence from judicial liens); FLA. STAT. § 222.11
(exempting 100% of wages for personal labor or services of head of household from garnishment. See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 421-22 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
90. The significance of this observation is limited by the fact that in recent years the
Court has significantly limited the use of section 1983 for recovery for the tortious acts of state
and local officials, agents and employees. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
91. 99 S. Ct. 1139 (1979).
92. Id. at 1150.
93. Id. at 1146-47.
94. Id. at 1152 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
95. In affirming the holding of Edelman, the Court extended its rule to cover section 1983
suits against states for retroactive relief. Edelman did not control the case at hand by its own
force and was subject to attack for two reasons. First, Edelman relied somewhat upon the
erroneous holding in Monroe, that cities are not section 1983 persons, which was later overruled in Monell. See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 452. But see Quern, 99 S. Ct. at 1144 n.7 (Justice
Rehnquist attempts to repudiate his own argument in Fitzpatrick). Second, in Edelman
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not authorize retroactive awards against states by stating that any
question about the validity of Edelman raised by Fitzpatrick and
Monell were "largely dispelled""8 in Alabama v. Pugh. 7
In Pugh, inmates of Alabama state prisons sued the State of
Alabama and the Alabama Board of Corrections as well as numerous individual officials for violations of the eighth and fourteenth
amendments. The federal district court granted and the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed prospective, injunctive relief.
Following a grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the
State of Alabama and the Alabama Board of Corrections could not
be sued, without Alabama's consent, due to the eleventh amendment and ordered the circuit court on remand to dismiss the governmental entities from the suit. 8 Of course, all of the equitable orders
were valid and enforcible against the state through its officers,
amounting merely to harmless error.9
In Quern the Court relied upon Pugh, a brief per curiam opinion
issued on the last day of the term without briefs or arguments, to
settle "any questions" raised concerning the continuing validity of
Edelman. As Justice Brennan points out in Quern, Pugh did not
even mention section 1983, and it did not deal with the issue of
whether Congress abrogated Alabama's eleventh amendment immunity by making states "persons" for section 1983 purposes." 0 The
Court's use of Pugh to "dispel" questions about the soundness of
Edelman following Monell borders on the absurd.
In Quern the Court also relied upon Fitzpatrick,stressing that the
amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made express mention of states and state employees and clearly indicated
that suit was authorized against them, whereas section 1983 speaks
only to "persons."'' Nonetheless, the Court has previously authorized suits against states notwithstanding the eleventh amendment
02
where express statutory mention of states was absent.
neither the parties nor the Court addressed the issue of whether a state is a person for section
1983 purposes.
96. 99 S. Ct. at 1144.
97. 438 U.S. 781 (1978).
98. Id. at 782.
99. Ever since the historic decision of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Court has
enforced equitable decrees against state officers and, thereby, indirectly against the state.
Nothing is changed by dismissing the action against the state. It is fully enforceable against
the state through its officials.
100. 99 S. Ct. at 1151. Pugh noted only that the State of Alabama had not given its
consent to suit. 438 U.S. at 782. Consent is relevant only where Congress has not removed
the eleventh amendment immunity.
101. 99 S. Ct. at 1146-47.
102. Express mention of states in the statute is only one way that a showing of the
requisite congressional intent may be made. Quern suggests that the Court will require a
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The Court's holding in Quern is based upon the conclusion that
the language and history of section 1983 do not reveal sufficient
congressional intent to authorize suits against states. This conclusion is largely unfounded. When viewing all of the eleventh amendment cases and not just the ones that support the Court's present
position, it is evident that sufficient evidence does exist for the
Court to justify extension of the section 1983 remedy to the states.
V.

CONCLUSION

In recent years the Burger Court's decisions have substantially
reduced the scope and volume of section 1983 litigation. 03 The Court
has heeded complaints that ready access to the federal forum has
strained federal-state relations, overloaded the federal courts,"'
watered down the Constitution, and removed any incentive for state
courts to assume responsibility for protecting civil rights of individuals. These considerations undoubtedly influence the Court's eleventh amendment decisions as well. In addition, the Court is clearly
guided by its desire not to usurp congressional power by prematurely inferring intent to remove state immunity. While these considerations have merit, the Court should not be so overly cautious
or sensitive to intergovernmental relations that individuals with
legitimate claims are forced to seek relief solely in the very state
courts that were found to be deficient in the past.
The requirement of a clear showing of congressional intent to
authorize suit against states to overcome the eleventh amendment
is justified.'" However, the Court should be willing to locate this
intent by reference to the history and purpose of the statute as well
as to its express language.'" If the Court stands by its dicta in
Quern, it had adopted an unduly restrictive view of the statutory
language and history of section 1983, and has given no weight to
the broad purpose of the statute. Certainly, the statutory language
of section 1983 is not as explicit as that examined in Fitzpatrick,
nor is the legislative history as clear as that found sufficient in
Hutto. However, nothing in those cases suggests that they establish
literal reference to states. Such a strict rule of construction would insure that the Court would
not remove immunity when it was not intended though it may well deny intended relief and
require too much of Congress. A preferable approach is that adopted in Hutto, a full search
of legislative history and reasonable interpretation of statutory language.
103. See generally 15 DuQ. L. REv. 49 (1976).
104. Section 1983 and Federalism: The Burger Court's New Direction, supra note 71, at
915.
105. Cf. Tribe, supra note 28, at 693-96 (Congress rather than the Court must abrogate
the states' immunity).
106. See generally 1974 DUKE L.J. 925, 961.
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minimum standards. The broad language of the Act and the
sweeping statements of the legislative proponents of section 1983
when coupled with the beneficial purpose of the Act should satisfy
the abrogation requirements of the eleventh amendment.
Unquestionably, the Court's review of the legislative histories in
Quern and Hutto and apparent rejection of the strict version of the
Employees clear meaning rule is laudable.107 Unfortunately, the
Court stops short of the mark. The prospective, injunctive relief now
available, if the Court stands by Quern, will not make plaintiffs
whole for the physical, mental and financial injuries resulting from
governmental violations of civil rights. It appears that civil rights
advocates will either have to get the language of section 1983
amended or turn to other provisions of federal law such as the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to secure a viable damages remedy against the
states.
107. The Court has constantly relied upon the legislative history of section 1983 when
searching for congressional intent, and there is little reason for the Court to close its eyes to
legislative histories merely because constitutional principles are involved. See, e.g., Mitchum
v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238 (1972).

